The tremors experienced in international relations since 1989 have significantly altered political geography of Eurasia, sweeping away the international system that had been built up over may years. The sudden emergence of Central Asian and Caucasian states caught both the local populations and the world at large unprepared for the event. The fact that no major empire has dissolved in this century without their successor states undergoing Cİvil wars or regional conflicts made the occasion more dramatic. Even in those newly independent states, which so far avoided unrest and conflicts, the competition between various outside powers for influence, threatened widespread disagreements, hostility, and possible armed interventions, There is a need for a new broader and more flexible analytical model for the form er Soviet Central Asia and the Cacasus. This paper, in addition to suggesting an alternative geopolitical framework for analysis, will also try to identify the sources of unrest and possible threats to the stability of the region. And finally, mechanisms for diffusing at least some of the controversies and threats will be discussed within the context of the prospects awaiting the region in the mid-Iong term.
ı.Introduction
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The changes experienced in international relations since 1989 have significantly altered the political geography of Eurasia. The sudden emergence of the Central Asian and Caucasian states caught both the local populations and the world at large unprepared. During most of the twentieth century, the strategists and geopolitical experts considered these lands as the Soviet Union's hinterland. The US, on the other hand, simply tried to "contain" these areas by linking its various alignment systems. Thus, Turkey, Iran and Pakistan became important outposts of this policy, while Korea and Vietnam became its battleground, and China was useful in the chain insofar as it quarrelled with the Soviet Union.
However, the collapse of the Soviet Union has changed this situation dramatically, putting the newly independent states of Central Asia and the Caucasus (CA&C) firmly into geopolitical calculations. This is both because it was discovered that some of them sit on vast natural resources, notably oil and gas, and because some of them were immediately engulfed in what was described as ethnic conflicts. Even in those newly independent states that so far have avoided unrest and conflicts, the competition between various outside powers for influence threatened widespread disagreements, hostility and possible armed interventions. The fact that most of these people, in modem times, were not allowed to handle thdr problems independently from Moscow and thus did not amass experience of self-governance, made the situation more complex. Moreover, while Russia's power and influence weakened, the newly independent states of CA&C have taken different roads toward national consolidation, and regional economic and political alliances, thereby raising international security and policy issues that did not exist before the fall of Soviet power.
What is more, most of the boundary lines that eventually became international borders of the newly independent states in 1991, especially in CA&C, were drawn arbitrarily first in the 1920s and reshuff1ed again after the Second World War, with the aim of creating rifts between local people in order to facilitate the manipulation of ethnic differences and thereby strengthen the hand of the central authorities. These borders, which rarely coincided with any historic boundaries or with the linguistic and cultural affinities of the different sub-groups, becarne, nevertheless, over the 70 years of Soviet rule, entrenched in the popular mind and acquired certain legitimacy. Many people, who had never in history considered themselves different from their neighbours beyond their household or clan structures, gradually developed a kind of national consciousness based on differences created artificially by the arbitrary border lines. Moreover, some ethnic gmups were deported from their homelands on the basis of offıcial nationalities during and after the Second World War. This event also helped to shape notions of different national identities, especially in the Northern Caucasus, where the entire populations of the Karachay, Balkar, Ingush and Chechen national groups were deported and resettled in Central Asia and Siberia. The sudden export of alien people to the se areas, in tum, created local resentments and enforced their distinct identities from the newcomers. The return of these groups to their former homelands after Khrushchev granted the right to return in 1956 also created clashes between them and the new settlers of their former territories. 1 FinaUy, the Russian conquest and prolonged rule of CA&C created a relationship of strong dependency between the peoples of these areas and the Russian state/Soviet Union that changed only slightly after the coUapse of Soviet rule.
During the Cold War, the world's attention, preoccupied by the predietable results of a catastrophic nuclear confrontation between the two blocs, had naturaUy focused on the global balance of power and strategie stability. Today, on the other hand, as there is no longer a superpower rivalry, world attention has turned towards the unfolding complexities of ethnic-based regional confliets. In this context, there is talk of the emergence of a new strategic region, encompassing most of Central Asia, the North Caucasus and Transcaucasia as well as such nearby states as Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan and even China. There are number of reasons to link up these distinct geographic areas together while dealing with the security and geopolitics of the post-Soviet space throughout Eurasia. These areas remain amatter of profound interest and of vital concem for Russia, which is ever sensitiye to extemal influence in or the possibi1ity of physical threats to its southem lınear abroad". For years, the region's outlets to the world were controlled by and from Moscow. Today, the number of political, economic and mi1itary actors who can influence the region's future has increased manifold. More importantly, within the emerging geopolitical equations, various factors contribute to the newly independent states' geopolitical reorientation away from their historic Russian bond. Among others, the combined effects of "geographic proximity, economic opportunity, ethnic and cuHural ties, and religion" gently push the evolution of the new states "in a southerly direction, toward historical preferences and allegiances that were interrupted by Russia's sealing of Central Asia to its own advantage".2
These developments, however, have caused anxiety, to say the least, among Russian decision-makers, who by the end of 1992 came to the conclusion that "the continuing independence of the Transcaucasian and Central Asian nations and reorientation of their foreign policy, economic and transportation strategies toward the south will considerably undermine Russia's great power status".3 Losing its monopoly of regional transport and communications due to projects to build oil and gas pipelines and highways southward will also lead to the loss of direct access to the region's rich natural resources and strategic minerals. As Russia continues to depend heavily on supplies of raw materials from Central Asian states, disengagement from the region is not economically desirable either. Finally, in addition to the decrease in Russia's overall role in the region, many Russians seem psychologically incapable of accepting a change in the status of the newly independent states. They continue to see the fonner Soviet southem border as Russia's outer frontier. 4 Consequently, Russia, since 1992, has been actively pursuing a policy to re-establish the economic, political and military controlover Transcaucasia and Central Asia. In this context, Putin's latest overtures towards the region are by no means unique. Theyare the latest round of continues Russian effort to stage a come back.
However, for various reasons, the area is also of increased relevance to Turkey, Iran, China and, increasingly, the US and the Western European countries. Consequently, the conflicting interests of a number of regional and extra-regional powers give rise to new strains on regional peace and stability.
In a sense, the possibility of transferring large-scale oH and gas deposits to World markets raises hopes for regional economic development and prosperity. At the same time, however, "the belief that whoever secures the major share of oH pipeline transit will gain enhanced influence not only throughout the Caucasus and Central Asia but also on a global political scale", highlights the concerns about the future stability of the region. In tenns of regional geopolitics, "control of the Caspian, or even freedom of movement upon it, represents a prize of considerable value", and the competition for influence among regional states, with its ideological, religious and political dimensions, lowers the threshold for possible anned conflicts erupting in the region.5 Consequently, the rivalry over the Caspian Basin's energy resources, interacting with many regional conflicts surrounding the area and with international efforts to bring peace to these conflicts, elevates the region to one of unique geopolitical interest that harbours various threats to regional and wider international peace and stability.
Therefore, there is a need for a broader and more flexible analytical model for the fonner Soviet CA&C. As Clem puts it, "Regions are for the geographer a c1assification scheme, much as periods serve historians. As is trne for chronology, there is no allpurpose definition for divisions of geographical space." For "G. Gleason political reasons and simplicity they provide, "regional definitions are often based on political boundaries, although these boundaries usually encompass important internal differences and frequently divide like places. Thus, the operational definition of a region may not be entirely satisfactory for one's specific needs. "6 For the purpose of this paper, then, i will forego the simplistic version of geopolitical classification, and will refer to a vast region stretching from the Black Sea into western China and Mongolia as Central Eurasia, based on the assertion that, "notwithstanding the inherent problem s of regionalisation, there is much that binds the region into a relatively coherent whole", especially in geo-political and geo-economic senses, though, at the same time, allowing identification of distinctive sub-regions. Hence, although there is no doubt that the Caucasus and Central Asia are two separate regions in the turbulent post-Soviet geopolitical space, with different political dynamics and plenty of internal diversity and conflicts, the working definition of "Central Asia and the Caucasus" used in this paper, seeking to trace the interplay of economic, political and strategic interests of the various actors across these areas, has considerable utility as a framework for describing and explaining the complex geopolitics of this important and dynamic area. 7 Indeed, CA&C share several common characteristics. Both regions are multiethnic in nature with contentious borders dividing interrelated ethnic groups. Theyare also experiencing similar economic, political, and social changes and difficulties that the end of totalitarian Soviet role brought about. These regions, with more than 100 different ethnic and linguistic groups, now face newly unleashed forces of destroction that Soviet authoritarianism once contained. ,They remain as regions where the implications of sudden independence and titular nationalities' realisation of ethnic identities ensured the onset of severe ethnic strife, enforced migration, economic deprivation and widespread unemployment. Hence, it is no wonder that their transition from Soviet rule to independence has resulted in the eruption in Abkhazia, South 6R. Clem, "The New Central Asia: Prospects for Development" in M. The root causes of many of the recent conflicts in CA&C were largely planted during the Soviet era and, when the Soviet system coIlapsed suddenIy in 1991, most of the people in the region were iLI prepared for independence and in no position to control the emerging dangers. Thus, there are doubts today about the future stabi1ityof CA&C as these states are trying to achieve the unprecedented task of simultaneously adopting new economic systems, building democratic political institutions and creating new national identities. Within this grim picture, geopolitical domino theories for the region can readily suggest various scenarios of explosive instabi1ity. Given the unstable nature of the political situation within the region in general, the prospects for destabi1isation are very real indeed. Economic difficulties, contested borders, mixed national groups and peoples, and outsiders' competition for influence, pose risks to regional security. Other volatHe and widespread elements, such as poverty and territorial c1aims, threaten continuously to undennine both the existing regimes and equi1ibrium in the region.
The purpose of this paper, therefore, is to identify the sources of unrest and possible threats to the future stabi1ity of CA&C region. As a working hypothesis, we can project a number of interrelated and overlapping levels of threat to security and stabi1ity in the region, emanating from both within and without. First, domestic sources of conflicts in the area, such as ethnic diversity, religious differences, economic inequality and totalitarianism should be explored. Second, the influence and foreign policies of a number of countries active in CA&C should be dealt with, devoting particular attention to the attempts and inabi1ity of Russia to reconsolidate its power and hegemony in the region. Third, the legal quandary over the definition of the Caspian Sea's status and the controversy surrounding the issue of transporting its natural resources out of the region have to be explored. In this context, the serious questions conceming environmental and ecological issues arising from oil exploration activities in the Caspian Sea need to be elucidated. FinaIly, mechanisms for diffusing at least some of the controversies and THETUR~SHYEARBOOK [VOL. XXXII threats will be discussed within the context of the prospects awaiting the region in the mid-to long-term.
Domestic Sources of InstabiHty
As the disintegration of the USSR became imminent, national minorities rediscovered long-suppressed identities and sought new rights. While the process of nation and state building in the western republics of the former Soviet Union was a quite straight forward matter and went smoothly, it has been a slow and agonising experience in CA&C, involving both domestic and regional rivalries as well as international influences and pressures. The main question is how the newly independent states of CA&C are responding to the strains of this transition in their domestic politics and external relations. In general terms, the two regions have dealt with the post-Soviet transition in different ways, and their divergent paths have resulted in different levels of confiict.
To a large extent, Central Asia has thus far avoided major violent upheavals, with the exception of Tadjikistan. This relative lack of tension could be attributed to the fact that all of the current heads of state in the region, again excluding Tadjikistan, have maintained a degree of continuity with the Soviet era, monopolising power and preserving many of the major institutions. However, their "success" so far in addressing the traumas of post-Soviet transition and ensuring short-term stability has of ten been dependent upon their well being and individual strength, which is not an adequate basis to ensure long-term stability. In fact, some of Central Asia's authoritarian regimes, seen as helpful for regional stability, may actually be concealing fundamental problems, al10wing the seeds of future confiicts to grow.
In contrast, the newly emergcd Caucasian leaders discarded the Soviet political tradition and the legacy of the old regime, and instead tried to create their own power bases and institutions. However, the new leaders who earlier nurtured the independence process or came to power immediately after independence, like Zviad Gamsakhurdia in Georgia and Abulfaz Elchibey in Azerbaijan, with their extreme nationalist rhetoric, were lacking both government experience and underlying connections to the local elite and power brokers. Consequently, their challenges to the existing political order resulted in a number of violent clashes, upheavals and, in some cases, civil war, which has over the past decade overwhelmed the Caucasus. The factors that may yet come to prominence as the particular situation demands are outlined below.
a. Ethnic Diversity and Identity
In addition to the challenges of economic and political transition faced by the other newly independent states of the forıner Soviet Union, the Central Asian and Caucasian states have had to contend with populations searching for and developing a sense of national identity. Thus, from the first day of their independence, they faced the all-imposing necessity of replacing the now "discredited" socialist ideologyand its social and economic model with a new thinking that could also he Ip them to define their separate "identities".
Although Central Asia in general and the Caucasus in particular have a long and rich history, and various levels of identification are discernible among the people, the individual states as they arose from communist domination, especially in Central Asia, had no sense of their separate identities in the modem sense. 8 Before the Russian conquest, people mainly identified themselves with their family, clan, tribe, locality and sometimes religion. The creation of five union republics in Central Asia and three in the Caucasus by the Soviet role, on the other hand, complicated the issue of national identities. The borders of the union republics, especially in Central Asia, did not see k to create homogeneous republics or confirın with historic quasi-identities. Rather, they divided people and shattered whatever identity and "sense of belonging" existed hitherto, and attempted to replace them with identities flowing from officially recognised republic borders. The product of this "nationality engineering" was a poisonous mixture of various local, tribal and ethnic groups. Even a casual look today at "the ethnic overlap from one state to another as well as artificial nature of the boundaries between thern" dearly indicates to potential crises based on nationality questions for nearly all the Central Asian and Caucasian states, which could easily "destroy whatever political equi1ibrium exists both within and between them."9 During the Soviet era, strict authoritarian control and suppression kept the destabi1ising character of ethnic and religious diversity under control. However, the root causes of instabi1ity were never dealt with, which eventually contributed to the region's turmoil as the forces of destmction were unleashed following the collapse of the Soviet Union without providing adequate mechanisms to cope with them.
When, in the early 1920s, the central authorities in Moscow drew the political boundaries of the then union republics of the USSR, they paid no attention to local ethnic identities. A number of territories that had existed as single social, political and economic units for centuries were divided among different republics. In contrast to this, many areas that had no previous unity of purpoSe were allocated to a single republic, causing problems of identity and integration. These policies naturally "exacerbated differences among peoples and regions" and have "contributed to" tension between the newly independent states of Eurasia. Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. The Chinese are extremely agitated about the prospects of further instabmty spreading from, or being supported by, the newly independent states of Central Asia. 11 The same kind of ethnic mixture is present in both Transcaucasia and the Northem Caucasus, and these have already caused open conflicts. Although each of the independent Transcaucasian states has its own dominant titu1ar nation, each also has a significant number of minorities. 12 The situation in the region is further complicated by the diversification of religious faiths that are closely related to the separate national-ethnic identities. More complicated than this is the existing situation in the North Caucasus, astride the southem boundary of the Russian Federation and the Transcaucasus. With its nineteen native national groups (as the last Soviet census recognised in 1989) and a significant ethnic Russian Diaspora as well as non-titular populations of Cossacks, Nogai and a number of others, the North Caucasus is one of the most ethnically and linguistically diverse regions of the world. Embracing three main linguistic groups and almost all religious nuances, the North Caucasus presents a complicated situation where a number of minorities and more than one titular nationality share the same territory. Obviously, all of the North Caucasian "nationalities" are prone to instability and conflict in future, which makes it very difficult for both Russia and extemal states to come to an understanding of the regional realities. 
b. Religious Differences and the Rise of Islam
It is obvious today that the long periods of Russian imperial role and atheistic Soviet-era indoctrination failed to eliminate the influence of Islam from the Muslim-populated lands of the fonner Soviet Union. 13 Islam's position as an important element of individual and collective self-identity in the region guaranteed its survival and present strength, which has become, since the Iate 1980s, an incre'!.Singly politicised vehicle.
Generally, programme of nation building throughout the region since the independence has been represented by the largely secular elites, who almost from the beginning faced a dilernma, especially in Central Asia. They soon realised, on the one hand, that Islam remained an important part of the region's social and cultural life, and, if exploited as a political tool, offered various advantages to them. Consequently, all the regional leaders have sought to introduce an Islamic dimension into their policies.
At the same time, however, theyalsa feared too great a tilt toward Islam in their respective states, which could have ousted them at any time. As they "had no intentian of allowing Islamic activism to challenge their own pasitions" ,14 all the postindependence constitutions of the Muslim republics emphasise their secular nature, as well as the principle of separation of religion and state. In an attempt to combine these conflicting positions, the Central Asian leaderships, since gaining independence, have embarked on a policy of co-habitation with a moderate type of Islam while preventing all political manifestations of political Islam. 15 The ratianale behind this co-habitation is that, "since there is a demand, it is better that this demand is met" by the state to prevent hard-liners stepping in to meet it. l6 However, the strategy of simultaneous repression and co-habitation by no means insulates the existing regimes from the challenges of Islam, especia11y if secular political institutions are also not allowed to develop.l?
There is of course a similar danger in the North Caucasus that political Islam could grow because of the unpredictable changes, disi11usioned hopes, economic deprivation and lack of opportunities for employment. 18 This possibi1ity has been of special interest to international and regional actors, in addition to the local political elite. And at times, the prevention of an upsurge in Islamic mi1itancy and the emergence of Islamic-oriented governments in CA&C was put forward as a primary objective of both Russia and the West.
The idea of establishing a single Islamic state in Central Asia or in the Cilucasus, on the other hand, is unacceptable to the existing leadership of those republics. Opposition to the idea also comes from Russia and Turkey, whose combined influence is considerable in both regions. Moreover, the presence of a large Russian Diaspora throughout the area makes any altempt to establish an Islamic state even more difficult. 19 Though religious fanatidsm could tum out to be a dangerous factor in the future, especially as an ideological vehicle for counter-elites trying to mobilise the masses, so far it has not been a significant source of conflict in CA&C. But, Islam as a cultural phenomenon "remains a potent force...albeit underground. Therefore, it is conceivable that in the future it may yet come to play an important social and political role." Above all, if the development of secular democratic institutions and channels of popular expression are blocked while current govemments faH to improve their people's living conditions, then "Islam may emerge as the only vehicle for the expression of grievance and dissent."20
c. Economic lnequality, Poverty and Corruption
Central Asia and the Caucasus offer tremendous economic opportunities in the post-Soviet world. Oil, natural gas and the gold industry are the most attractive areas for foreign investment. The regions can serve as a potentially valuable transit corridor. However, possible uneven development patterns are a significant potential source of instabmty in both CA&C. Differences in the natural resource bases could provoke economically driven migration, polarise ethnic groups and cause increased tensions. This, combined with widespread unemployment creates potential for conflict.
It is also worth considering what effect the anticipated wealth resulting from these natural resources will have on regional problems and the potential for confrontation. There are concerns, for example, that countries gaining most from the exploitation of natural resources might use their newly gained wealth to increase their military spending, thus creating a destabilising change in the regional balance of power.
The redistribution of wealth within societies is another potential source of conflict. There is no doubt that wealth from natural resources can offer a means for future regional development. if mismanaged, however, it could be tremendously destabilising. [VüL.xxxn societies emerging along the lines of those commonly found on the Arabian Peninsula.
On the other hand, the extreme poverty found in parts of Central Asia has been and will continue to be a destabilising factor in the region. The rapid economic and social changes since the collapse of the Soviet Union have left many people with a much lower standard of living than they previously had and without the social safety net the Soviet regime provided. These rapid changes and economic pressures have aıready led to a marked inerease in personal eorruption and, eonsequently, a negative impaet on regional stability.
Another problem eonneeted with the regional eeonomie downtum is drug traffieking and related eriminal activities. Although it has not yet played a very substantial role in region al politics, the rate at whieh drug traffieking is spreading, especially in Central Asia, is worry, which brings with it eorruption, arms dealing and possibilities of eonfliet,21 thereby threatening a general breakdown of social order and unstable politieal systems.
d. Lack of Democracy and Authoritarianism
The politieal ideology that has replaeed eommunism in CA&C can best be described as "secular authoritarianism" with a dose of free market philosophy. The regional leaders have all concluded that, given present conditions in their countries, a period of authoritarian rule is a necessary stage in the transition from eommunist totalitarianism to liberal demoeraey. While the struggle for national identifieation goes on within eaeh republie, authoritarianism provides a tempting solution as "the only way to keep the eountry together". That, of eourse, was the justifieation for the Soviet iron hand. It is disappointing to see the authoritarian approaches of most of the Central Asian and Caueasian leaders are presented as the sole rational response to potential ethnic divisions within their republics and as a rationalisation for their hold on power. Also, this may be a souree of long-term trouble as it puts a 21See reports by E. Iran replacing Russia and Great Britain for influence in the region. 23 However, this model was overly simplistic. "Unlike the original nineteenth century "Great Game", the twentieth century version has a number of players", including Russia, Turkey, Iran, China and the Wesı. AIso, "not only governments were involved, but foreign and multinational corporations as welL." Today, for the most part, the "Great Game", if we may still use the same phraseology, "consists of economic competition for jobs, pipelines, and new markets" as well as political influence and strategic advantages. As for the states of CA&C, in contrast to the situation in the nineteenth century, national leaders now have little objection to foreign involvement in the region. That is, theyare actively seeking foreign investors as well as models and guidance on which to base their developmenı. 24 In this context, external involvement can have a positive impact on regional contlict resolution by providing investrnent, creating employment and supplying much-needed foreign aid to regional markets. However, profit margins that many believe will accrue from the region's natural resources, combined with geopolitical and strategic factors, lure external players into a dangerous game, played out within and throughout the region.
a. Weakening of Russian Power and lnfluence
Russia wishes to keep its presence in the area and is likely to remain engaged for the foreseeable future. But, its own serious economic problem s and political weaknesses, which are exacerbated by internal power struggles, have hampered Russia's efforts to restore its hegemony. Thus, while Russia is ever sensitive to the growing foreign presence and influence in the region and tries to curb both, its influence continues to dec1ine and is constantly being undermined.
Russia's most notable activity in post-Soviet Central Asia has took place in Tadjikistan. It's mmtary intervention on behalf of the Tadjik government, also supported by Uzbekistan, contributed to regional stabi1ity by helping to contain the contlict, regardless whether the official justification of thwarting the spread of Islamic extremism was warranted. it was also Russian pressure that forced the Tadjik government to negotiate with the opposition groups, thus contributing to the peace deal signed in June 1997. Even so, the intervention created tension between the Tadjiks and Uzbeks living in Tadjikistan, and the fact that the success of the peace process largely depends on Russian co-operation and goodwill carries within it the seeds of instabmty. 25 SimilarIy, Russian manoeuvring in the Caucasus has been the most important destabmsing factor in the region. 26 Despite dire 25CPSS Bishkek Workshop, pp. 5-6. 26For evaluations of Russian interventions into the Caucasus, both in histüric and contemporary terms, see P. Henze, "Russia and the Caucasus", and D. Nissman, "Russia and the Caucasus: Maintaining the Imbalance of Power", both in Perceptions, Vol. 1 (2), June-August 1996; P. Baev, consequences, because of competing power stroctures within the Russian Federation (induding the military, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the oil and gas lobby), there flow, not surprisingly, contradictory and uncoordinated actions towards the region up until 1995. Since then, however, Russians have been able to put together a more coherent policy, aimed at stopping the further weakening of Russian power and influence.
Though the Russian presence and pressure has been, at times, perhaps the single greatest destabilising factor throughout CA&C, it is de ar now that a further Russian withdrawal from the region could also have a negative impact by creating a power vacuum, which in tum could lead to chaos and instability. After all, it was in the void following the collapse of the USSR that numerous disturbances arose throughout the newly independent states. Judging from the positive examples of Georgia and Tadjikistan, where Russia has managed to provide tentative and precarious security through the armed forces it maintains in the region, it could be argued that a healthy amount of contact with Russia would help to solve the problems related to active conflicts. In the meantime, however, the Russian position against the influences of regional powers, titular nationalism and Western economic penetration is increasingly pronounced and sometimes gives the impression that it may overreact to the perceived threats to, or the loss of, its traditional sphere of influence, possibly even resorting to the use of armed force. The bottom line is that as geography cannot be changed and Russia will maintain, or at any rate attempt to maintain, a presence in the region, the key to regional peace and stability is in Russian hands.
b. Turkish lnfluence and Foreign Policy
Immediately after the collapse of the USSR, while the identity question was discussed earnestly among the locals and by outsiders interested in the outcome, Turkey was cited as an important actor because of its strong historical, cultural, ethnic and "Can Russia Do lt Alone in the Caucasus?", Perceptions, Vol. 2 (3), September-November 1997. Also see pp. 32-36 of this paper.
linguistic bonds with the newly independent states of Central Asia (plus Azerbaijan). Thus the positive role Turkey might play in this region was extensively discussed not only within Turkey but also in the West, whose fear that radical Islam might fill the power vacuum that emerged in the region !ed to strong encouragement to these states to adopt a "Turkish model" of secular democracy combined with a liberal economy.
Turkey too, wanted to act as a window or link to the international community. Moreover, their emergence as independent states at a time when Turkey was experiencing the negatiye effects of the end of the Cold War on its security and foreign policies was looked upon as a welcome break and an unprecedented historical opportunity to be utilised for political, economic and psychological gains. 27 However, blown-up expeetations and euphorie pronouneements were soo n modified by realityand Turkey has had to backtraek on some of its earlier pledges regarding extensive eeonomie aid. Then, disappointment followed on both sides. In particular, the Central Asian states doubted Turkey's ability to provide models for educatiön and eeonomie development, while the Turks have beeome irritated by the half-hearted responses they reeeived from Central Asians to Turkish overtures.
27The then Turkish president, Turgut Özal, in his opening speeeh of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey (GNAT) on 1 September 1991, desenbed the sİtuation as a "histone opportunity" for the Turks to becbme a "regional power" and urged the GNAT not to "throw away this change whieh presented itself for the first time in 400 years". Source: From different country reports of nCA which were published in Ankara in 2000.
Moreover, Turkey's eager moves in the region to forge closer relations made its rivals question whether Turkey was aiming for regional hegemony. Although Turkish leaders have repeatedly articulated that the fear of a revival of pan-Turkism as an extension of Turkey's efforts in CA&C is unfounded, its neighbours' suspicions continued to hound Turkey. Turkey's emphasis on commonalties between the Turks and the Turkic-speakers of CA&C, also created resentrnent among them, since it was in direct conflict with "the individual and separate self-identity and national awareness formulated by each of these people. "28 it became clear that, though they shared a common Turkic origin, the Turkic peoples of Central Asia had a strong sense of distinctiveness and preferred to assert their own individual identity rather than be submerged within a broader cultura! and political umbrella. 29 28 0. Kesic, "American-Turkish Relations at a Crossroads", Mediterranean Quarterly, Vol. 6 (1), winter 1995, p. 101. 29aÜfeVKimura, Turkey in a Changing World, p. 194. Source: Turkish Ministry for National Education (MNE).
Perlıaps resulting from this disappointment, Turkey has since then increasingly moved its attention to the Caucasus, a region that may yet prove more promising for partnership than did Central Asia. In addition to geographic proximity, which Turkey can utilise successfully for its benefit, the lures of the Caspian oil potential and the need to transfer it to Westem markets provide an added incentiye for closer involvemenl. However, any possibility of an armed clash with the Russian Federation is particularly disturbing from the Turkish perspective. Since Russia is still the only great power in the Caucasus theatre, Turkey, understandably, tries to avoid alienating or alanning Moscow, taking care in its dıetoric and activities as the Russians are acutely sensitiye to any pan-Turkic, as well as Islamic, trends in the area.
On the other hand, Turkeyand Iran also became rivals for a while in trying to create spheres of influence at the southem portions of the fonner Soviet Empire. In spite of their initial enthusiasm in approaching these republics, however, it has become increasingly apparent that both Turkeyand Iran lacked the economic resources that would enable either of them to exercise a dominating influence in the region, and it was the Russian assertiveness since 1995 that put an end to this flourishing rivalry.
c. Iranian lnfluence and Policy
Iran has thus far been less of a player in the new "Great Game" though its presence in the region has taken an uptum in recent years. There were many reasons for Iran's bad start. Among the factors that prevented further expansion of Iranian influence in the region are: its overwhelming Shi'ite population while the majority of Moslems in CA&C are Sunnis; its openly theocratic character, which is unacceptable to the region's secular leaders; and its policy of confrontation with the West, to whom the newly independent states of CA&C continue to appeal for aid and assistance.
Consequently, Iran's influence in Central Asia extended only as far as Tadjikistan because Islam's attraction has been stronger there than anywhere else in Central Asia, and because of the ethnic, cultural and linguistic closeness of the two states. Iran's other close affiliation has been with Turkmenistan, uti1ising their long common border. From this position, "Iran has subsequently had some success in projecting a more positive image in the region."30 Most importantly, Iran's policies in the region have been more moderate than was originally anticipated. It has been quite careful 30R Iran's engagement in the Caucasus has been less gratifying, with Annema the only part of the region where it has had some influence. Although at fırst it appears anomalous that the Islamic Republic of Iran should make successful inroads in Christian Annenia while its relations with Shi'ite Azerbaijan remains tense at best, economic interests and geopolitical calculations, not religion, dominates this complicated triangle. In general, however, Iran's internal economic problems give it little to offer CA&C in tenns of money and technology, and its international isolation cripples its capabilities.
d. China and Central Asia
Motivated by its increasing demand for energy, China has aıready begun to invest heavily in the oil-rich states of CA&C, especially in Kazakhstan. Trade between China and the Central Asian states are also flourishing. Moreover, for the authoritarian Central Asian leaders, China's development strategy, mixing communist ideology with a gradual transition to a market economy in parts of the country, is an attractive modeL. Further, close reJations with China may also help the Central Asians to counter the Russian post-Soviet hegemonic drive in the region. At the same time, conversely, the Central Asian's are attempting to preserve some Russian presence in the region as a strategic protection against possible future Chinese demands and pressures.
For its part, China fears that its Uighur minority, influenced by the liberation of their "Turkic brethren" across the border, might resort to increasingly violent means to achieve independence themselves and perhaps even organise a rebellion from bases in Central Asia, where many Uighurs liye.
On the wider geopolitical scene, China might become a major long-tenn threat to Central Asia if only because of its massiye power potential and insistence on continuing its nuclear test programme in the areas bordering Central Asia. Moreover, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tadjikistan are especially suspicious about Chinese objectives because it laid claims to large parts of their territory during the 1970s and 1980s, while the area was still part of the Soviet Union. 31 
e. Extension ofWestern lnfluence
There are various opportunities for Westem investrnent and expertise in the region, and hence the possibi1ity of clashes of interest. There is also a real possibi1ity that the resultant economic benefits in time could also alter or even reverse the traditional orientation of the regional countries towards Russia. However, Russia is not likely to welcome Westem economic involvement in, assistance to and exploitation of resources in the region, any of which may ron counter to its perceived interests there. 32 The Russians are already concemed because they perceive that American influence in the whole of CA&C expands proportionally to the reduction of Russian weight and influence. in this context, Turkey's position, too, comes under suspicion as an agent of the West in the region, aiming to dislodge and displace Russian influence. 33 On the other side of the coin, the US has also become more active in CA&C in recent years. The openly stated US interest in the region comprises"strengthening regional economic [and political] mechanisms, developing east-west energy and transportation processes, and providing support to conflict resolution efforts." However, there are other geo-strategic and geoeconomic priorities for further US involvement, such as "containing Iran's influence in the region" and promoting 31Ibid., pp. 63-64. "American business interests and strategic plans." Moreover, American policymakers are also concerned about the possibi1ity of proliferation of weapons of mass destrnetion and Central Asia's growing drug trade.
Caspian Basin Resource Management
The attention of the wider international community has turned to CA&C in part because of its rich natural resources. The international competition for access to oH and gas reserves and the need to bring them to world markets. however, has had both positive and negative effects on regional conflicts.
Map 1: Caspian Region
The realisation that the full potential of regional wealth can only be enjoyed widely if its energy resources have stable access to international markets motivates regional co-operation and provides an incentiye for international efforts to resolve the region's conflicts. At the same time. competition between those countries wishing to host the pipelines out of the region creates numerous possibi1ities for conflict.
a. Importance of Energy Resources in the Caspian Region
The full development of Caspian Sea reserves is only at its initial stage and the majority of gas and oH reserves in this region have yet to be developed. During the Soviet era, most of the Caspian remained unexplored. Nevertheless, major discoveries made in Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan during the Soviet period indicate large reserves of oil, the production of which will increase with additional investment, new technologyand the development of new export out1ets. With its proven and prospective reserves, the area, although not another Middle East as some had hoped, could well be another North Sea.
Among the littorals of the Caspian Sea, Iran is the least interested in the immediate development of Caspian oil deposits because of its oil reserves elsewhere and its inability to utilise even them to their full potential due to the American embargo. Nevertheless, Iran is extremely interested in the distribution and the transportation of Caspian energy resources.
Russia's attitude is similar to Iran in that it does not feel the haste to develop the Caspian Sea's reserves as it already has large proven oil and gas reserves and production capacity in other parts of the country. Moreover, the Russian part of the Caspian shelf, provided it is eventually divided into national sectors, does not have promising oil reserves, though theyare not yet fully developed and further exploration may still uncover rich deposits. Furthermore, as it is aıready one of the more important oil-exporting countries, Russia, like Iran, would not be happy to see new oil export rivals emerging, especially out of its control.
Turkmenistan, like Russia and Iran, is not concerned for the urgent development of its Caspian oil reserves. Its Caspian coast is the least explored of all and it has large natural gas reserves elsewhere in the country. Therefore, Turkmenistan's short-to midterm objective is to develop an independent natural gas export infrastructure that does not have to pass through Russian territory. Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, on the other hand, are more interested than the others are in the immediate development and export of Caspian oil. This is because most of the proven oil resources in the area are concentrated near their shores and "theyare in greater need of [the] hard-currency funds that will come from the expolt [VOL. XXXII of oil", which would alsa enhance their economic and political independence from Russia. 34 ; However, none of the littorals of the Caspian Sea have the necessary capital to explore and exploit the regional hydrocarbon resources and they will ne ed foreign investment for the foreseeable future. Moreover, the technological complexity of extracting the oil deposits from sub-sea reservoirs further complicates the exploration in the Caspian Sea. Developments in international oil markets mayaıso unfavourably affect the development of Caspian Basin oil and gas projects, especially if world oil prices decrease or world oil supply is boosted by increases in oil extraction in the newly developed field s or from the traditional suppliers. Changes in international politics, such as the lifting of international sanctions against Iraq or a softening of the US pasition towards Iran, would alsa have an affecL 35 In any case, apart from the Caspian Sea littorals, a number of countries will have 10 investment. Therefore, hefore tapping the full henefits of Caspian oil and gas reserves, various legal, political and strategic issues have to he tackled and solved to the satisfaction of at least the majority of the littoral states, regional countries, Western oil companies and their governments.
b. Legal Status of the Caspum
During the Soviet period, most of the Caspian Sea coastline, apart from a small Iranian portion in the south, belonged to the Soviet Union. The collapse of the Soviet Union, however, brought about five states sharing the coastline and daiming jurisdiction over parts of the Sea. Although it is not difficult to see the urgent need for an explicit definition of the legal status of Caspian, the ongoing discussion among the liuoral states has tended to dwell on the definition of the Caspian as a sea or a lake, while the real problem appears to be one of sharing the profit. 36 In general, the choices regarding the status of the Caspian Sea under international law is hetween common ownership of the Caspian, thus subject to the joint sovereignty of all the liuoral states, and delimitation based on some sort of farınwa to be agreed on. Russia has argued that the Caspian is an object of common use by the littoral states on an equal basis. According to Russia's original position on the status of the Caspian, which Iran and Turkmenistan supported, the Law of Sea could not apply to the Caspian since it has no natural connection with other seas. Russia argued that it was an inland lake and should~govemed as such and that joint utilisation was the only way forward. Further, the Russians argued, the legal regime of the Caspian could not he changed unilaterally. They also advocated 20-mile territorial waters plus an additional 20-mile exclusive economic zone, with common ownership of the central area of the Caspian. In November ı996, however, Russia declared that, as a "compromise", it was ready LO recognise a 45-mile "off-shore economic wne for each country" and "the liUoral states jurisdiction over the oil fields whose development has already started or is about to start."37 This apparent "softening" in the Russian position was mainly due to the realisation that "it cannot stop the division of the sea."38 Russia's position regarding the legal status of the Caspian has further wavered with the passage of time and there have been conflicting signals from different government agencies. 39 Notably, the position of the Russian Foreign Ministry contradicts the po si tion of the Russian Ministry of Fuel and Energy, which supports the signing of contracts in which the Russian oil companies are participating.
In contrast to Russian position, the Azeri position was described as the "border lake" concept, with national sectors formed by central median line and the extension of international borders into the Caspian. Accordingly, each liuoral state in its own sector would have exclusive sovereignty over biological resources, water surface, navigation and exploitation of the seabed. At times, it has also aired the "open sea" concept with 12-mi1e territorial waters and adjoining exclusive economic wnes not exceeding 200 miles, in agreement with a centralline principle. 40 Recent negotiations between the Russian Federation and Azerbaijan have indicated that, perhaps as a result of pressure from the Russian oil company Lukoil, there is a possibility that Russia's stance on common ownership may become less rigid, moving towards the Azeri "border lake" concept, even though "the joint operation of an exploitation project in the central part of the Caspian is still, in essence, a projection of the common usage approach. "41 The Russian approach to Azerbaijan could be further modified.
Although Turkmenistan had earlier supported the Russia's Caspian position, its position has remained ambiguous since February 1997, when Turkmenistan's President, Saparmurad Niyazov, announced that the Azeri and Chirag oil deposits, which Azerbaijan had exp10ited unilaterally, were on Turkmenistan's territory. A fierce disagreement between the two countries ensued since then. 42 However, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan issued a statement in February 1998 to the effect that both countries agreed that the Caspian Sea area between them wou1d be divided along the median line, but disagreements over where to draw that line continue.
Iran continues to insist on a condominium solution, protesting against plans to construct underwater pipelines across the Caspian, favouring the transportation of oil by the existing pipelines through Iranian and Russian territory. Nevertheless, Iran could accept a sectoral principle of Caspian Sea division if its interests are taken into account. Indeed, it has aıready softened towards Azerbaijan after the latter awarded exploration rights in Shah-Deniz to Iran.
Behind all these controversies lies the fact that the yields from exploitation rights for individual states would great1y differ depending on the status of the Caspian. Were the Caspian to be divided among the littoral states, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan would have the largest share of proven oil deposits and exploitation rights and, in particular, under the "border lake" concept, they would 41Blandy, The Caucasus Region, p. 14. [VOL.xxxn obtain more than twice the amount that Russia would enjoy under the same concept of allocation. 43 Under the Russian 45-mile proposal, however, most Azeri offshore oil would be transferred to collective ownership.44
Moreover, underpinning the Russian position is the argument that it has certain "rights" in the newly independent states because their economies were developed with Russian financial support and expertise. 45 if Russia succeeds in its arguments, then it would also negatively affect the political independence of the other former Soviet countries because the condominium approach would definitely strengthen the dominant regional actor, giying it a veto power to undercut all the independent international investment that would enable these countries to break free from Russian political and economic pressures. 46 Other littoral states, however, are eager to realise their potential wealth from the Caspian in order to stabilise their shaky economies and domestic politics, as well as enabling them to distance themselves from the Russian sphere of influence, an endeavour that the US supports. The US also continues to strongly object to the condominium approach since it would bring Iran and Russia into the picture. 471n response to Russia's above-mentioned November 1996 proposal, the United States Special Envoy to the Newly Independent States, James it is obvious that any Caspian compromise will require the agreement of five littoral states and at least half a dozen other regional players with conflicting political and economic goals. in the absenee of an agreement, however, a worst-case scenario might even include the possibility of a military confrontation between rival states. 48 
c. Pipeline Routes and International Rivalries
One of the peculiar features of the Caspian oil picture is that the regional countries most interested in the early exploration and transportation of oil and natural gas are landlocked and have to rely on the goodwill and co-operation of their neighbours. As each country has a preference about how the oil and natural gas should be transported to market and extemal powers are trying to exert influence to ensure that the selected route best meets their needs, the issue assumes an importance quite separate from that of production.
Under the current geopolitical cakulations, Russia is keenly interested in retaining, or recovering, its political influence in the Caspian Basin. In order to acquire this advantage, Russia has insisted that the northem pipeline from Baku, Azerbaijan, to the Russian Black Sea port of Novorossiysk should be the main transit route for oil from the Caspian. This would ensure Moscow's exclusiye and strategic controlover the region's resources. Opposing Russian insistence on the northem route, the US and Turkey as well as the Caucasian states of Georgia and Azerbaijan prefer a western route through Georgia to the Turkish Collins, wrote in aletter to Azeri President Aliyev that the United States "upholds the idea of the sectoral division of the Caspian Sea". This letter marked a change in the United States position, which hitherto did not take part in discussion and argued that the legal status of the Caspian should be decided between the littoral states. See: "US Official Arrives in Azerbaijan", United Press International, 13 Mediterranean port of Ceyhan. What is at stake is not only oH and gas transit revenues that host countrles can extract from pipelines passing through their respective territorles, but more importantly, the pipeline network is one of the key factors in securing and maintaining influence throughout the region. 49 Quite dearly, usage of the westem route would give Turkey a greater influence than Russia, which, on the other hand, would benefit greatly from the northem route. United States' support for the westem route is firmly embedded in its wider Eurasian and Middle Eastem strategic priorities. One of them is to prop up the independence of the newly independent countries of CA&C against the influence of Russia. 50 Another strategic goal of the US is to "exclude Iran from participation in the producıion of Caspian oil and gas, and to prevent the development of transportation routes or pipelines that would lead from the Caspian region to either the Gulf or the Indian Ocean via Iran". This objective is, oh the one hand, closely intertwined with the dual containment polky of the US against Iran and Iraq, and, on the other, "connecled with the fundamental US strategy in theMiddIe East of not permilting the emergence of any dominant regional power capable of influencing the oil market in the Gulf. "51 Moreover, the US favours the Baku-Ceyhan route because it passes through pro-American counıries and would bind them closer to each other and to Westem interests. Moreover, it would also secure Turkey's role as a major player in the Caspian region, which, in tum, "would boost the status of a loyal NATO ally whose secular, moderate govemment could", after aU, "serve as a model for post-Sqviet states such as Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Turkmenistan" and could check the influences of Iran and Russia in the regiori 52 if theB.aku~Ceyhan pipelinewasbuirt and put into operation, its main effeet, would be to weaken or even cut off Central Asian and the Caucasian states' cconomie andtransportation,dependence on Russia. Azerbaijan, Kazakhsıan and Turkmenistan would appear as new competitors to Russiain.'the~ex.port of oil and gas to the world market, and would use themoney thus obtained to enhance On the other hand, the pereeived deerease in Russian influenee or outside attempts to isoIate or eliminate Russia in the Caspian region eould easily beeome eounter-produetive, and may quiekly eneounter an asymmetrie response potentially destroetive to the stabiHty of regional seeurity.
Obviously, the ehoiee of direetions for oil and gas transportation from theCaspian Sea region depends on a number of faetors. Among them, the geopolitieal eonsiderations of the major world powers and loeal seeurity problem s are at least as important as the financial eonsiderations, geographic loeation of the main eonsumers and the existing infrastroeture. Obviously, regional eonfliets, politieal instabiHty and a laek of regional eooperation have slowed the development of Caspian oil and gas resourees and export routes.
d. Environment and Ecology
The World's attention is attraeted to the region by regional rivalries over the highly explosive issues of oil extraetion, transportation and profit sharing, and oeeasionalIy by ethnie tensions. However, there is another important danger about whieh politicians and oil-interests generalIy remain sHent, namely the roination of the Caspian's eeosystem and an aeeompanying irreversible environmental damage.
The general eeological situation is already beyond reeovery throughout the region. In addition to the rising sea level and the flooding of eoastal areas, the problem of the inereasing saturation and greasiness of the soil further worsens the conditions. 53 Because of rising pollution, disturbances eaused by the hasty exploration of the coastal shelf and the development of offshore oilfields, various 531nadditionto the floodingof arable land and the problemof an overall populationof 700,000peoplepresentlyin needevaeuation, it is predicted that, by the year 2010, the water level will rise by a further25 metres. Blandy,The Caucasus Region, p. 25.
forms of aquatic life face the threat of extinction in the Caspian. Moreover, because of the concentration of hydrocarbon waste, the Azerbaijani coastline is now declared unsafe for humans. 54
This large-scale environmental and ecological damage underlines the need for an international authority to enforce compliance with appropriate environmental norms in the Caspian Basin. However, as the negotiations on legal issues sUffounding the Caspian Sea are intermingled with the resolution of environmental concems, the ongoing dispute over access to resources presents a major obstacle to the effective management of such problems, particularly at the supranational leveL.
Environmental questions sUffounding the Bosphorus in particular and the Black Sea in general have also begun to weigh heavily in the choice of export routes for Caspian oil. Exports through the Bosphorus have grown since the break-up of the Soviet Union in 1991, and there is increasing concem that projected Caspian Sea export volumes will exceed the ability of the Bosphorus to accommodate the tanker traffıc. 55 S. Conflict and/or Co-opera tion?
it is often argued that Central Asia's relative stability during the years of transition since independence has been due, in addition to the eontinuity of leadership sinee the Soviet period, to established eommunal social struetures and a tradition of toleranee. 56 However, regardless whether this assessment is correet, the effort to define national identities while struggling with postSoviet eeonomie and political transitions is placing that tradition of tolerance, 10 the extent that it exists, under great strain.
One way to strengthen the eulture of toleranee and help eultivate stability is to eneourage regional interaetions and eooperation. One of the first examples of regional eo-operation was the establishment of the Central Asian Union in 1994 between Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, whieh they formed to provide the institutional rneans to address shared eeonomie problems and to promote eeonomic and politieal stability in the region. Tadjikistan reeently joined this organisation, now known as the Central Asian Econornic Cornrnunity. Another emerging example of eo-operation within CA&C region, with links to the outside world as well, is the estabHshment of TRACECA (TRAnsport Comdor Europe Caucasus Asia). it is hoped that this European Union-funded project will enhanee regional stability by facilitating the regional exchange of goods and creating a landbased link between Europe and the region.
One of the most efficient ways to deal with regional seeurity problem s would of course be an arrangement for a region-wide eommon security organisation (such as recent Turkish proposal for Caucasian Stability Pact) along the lines of the OSCE, with maybe a standing peacekeeping force. 57 However, there are various 56During the CPSS Workshops mentioned earlier, all the participants from Central Asia insisted that this was the case and argued that perhaps the most important factor contributing to this tolerance was Central Asia's sharing of a common ancestry; that theyare all "brethren". 57 1 proposed this arrangement to deal with the instability in the region at a conference on "Central Asia and Magazine, 1998 (3) . In this context, the recent Turkish proposal for establishing a "Caucasian Stability Pact" is an interesting altempt that needs to be followed up. For developments surrounding the Turkish proposal see: "Caucasian Strife and Caspian OH obstacles to overcome before such an arrangement can be applied to CA&C. First, there is the probable Russian resistance to sharing its much-sought role of "peacemaker" for the region. Second, it would be difficult to find regional states that would send and pay the costs of its soldiers in rather far away parts of Central Asia or the Caucasus to make or keep peace in conflicts that pose little immediate danger to their interests. Third, and maybe most importantly, the regional countries, both the older and newer ones, are not known for their co-operative tendencies, and they look at each other today with suspicion about intentions. So, almost none of the pre-conditions for seuing up a regional common security organisation and conflict prevention mechanism exist within the region.
With this background, the outlook is not so bright and there are number of flash points that may erupt into an open armed conflict at any given time. Tension will continue to exist along the international borders between the Transcaucasian republics and the Russian Federation. NameIy, stability in the Caucasus will continue to be poisoned by; The state of continuing unease between Georgia and Abkhazia, on the one hand, and between Georgia and South Ossetia on the other; The Armenian occupation of the 20 percent Azeri territory in and around Nagorno-Karabakh; and the tension along the Dagestan-Azerbaijan border, where the Lezgins spread across both sides of the border.
Other conflict situations could include: disputes between the Ingush and the North Ossetians; continued unrest in Cheelınya; etlınic boundary disputes in Dagestan; a rekindIing of Tadjikistan's civil war; and the possibility of the Afghan civil war spilling over into neighbouring areas of Central Asia. New trouble spots might also emerge along the proposed pipeline routes from the Caspian, both along the northem route through Chechnya and the southem route through eastem Turkey. In addition, the following aspects of regional affairs should be watched concerning future trends in CA&C:
* Weakening of Russian power and influence
A further weakening of Russia's abi1ity to cope with the increasing crime rates in the Northern Caucasus, when coup1ed with its inabi1ity to tum the economic trends around, poses a serious immediate threat to the stability of the whole region. Moreover, if Russia's present financial and economic problems forces it to withdraw completely from the area, this would open up further possibi1ities for rivalries, even conflict between (extra) regional powers.
* The democratisation process
None of the major players in Central Asia or the Caucasus are fully democratic or stable. Their stability, to the extent that it exists, depends on one man's political and physical health, 1eaving them prone to protracted instability and internal conflict. Besides, personal authoritarianism makes political power an inherentIy unstable endeavour.
* Economic poverty and dependence on Western aid and assistance
With the exception of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, which are potentially rich countries due to their energy deposits, most of the countries in the region have little to count on for löng-term income and economic development. As theyare just beginning to recover from the all-encompassing transition, the challenges theyare facing are enormous. With ethmc strife, enforced migration, economic deprivation and widespread unemployment throughout the region, "there is an inescapable need for foreign economic assistance and expertise from the West to .reverse this trend."58 Otherwise, a worst-case scenario could 58Blandy, The Caucasus Region, p. 28.
include an extended armed conflict spreading either from Chechnya or Nagomo-Karabakh in the Caucasus or from Tadjikistan in Central Asia and eventually engulfing the whole area.
* Limited political controlover armed forces
None of the regional players have absolute democratic controlover their anned forces, whether key states or one of the score of non-state entities like the Chechens, Abkhazians or Karabakh Annenians. Even where controls exist, theyare not democratic ones that can foster long-term stability. There is therefore a serious danger of unauthorised groups touching off a war that drags in larger states.
* The Caspian Sea
An agreement on the Caspian's status is urgently needed to avoid a miscalculation that could lead to serious confrontation. in the absence of an agreement on status, which would also assist in the preservation of the Caspian ecosystem, the continuing dispute about oil extraction rights would simply drag on with the possibility of new complications emerging over time.
Although much has happened since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the independence of the Central Asian and Caucasian states, we cannot yet argue that the evolution of Eurasian geopolitics has ended. The five Central Asian and three Transcaucasian states may yet quarrel or re-align along, for example, national, ethnic, religious or economic lines, and the outcome "indeed the very process, threatens to alter political and military equations from China to the Balkans. Provides Azerbaijan with its first non-Russian export route. it has also served as a justification for military cooperation between GUUAM states, which staged an exercise last year based on defending the route.
Baku, Azerbaijan to Novorossiysk, Russia 100,000 bpd; can be expanded to 300,000 bpd for $600 million 870 miles Operational with a raillink and bypass around Chechnya Significance
Moscow envisions this pipeline functioning as Azerbaijan's primary export route. if completed as planned, the route will carry 600,000 bpd but at a construction cost of $1.2 billion to $1.5 billion. While China has slowed co-operation with Kazakhstan in energy initiatives, this proposa1 remains on the books as the only significant pipeline linking the former Soviet Union to China. Some version of a Kazakhstan-China pipeline will be needed over the long-term to feed China's energy needs.
Tengiz, Kazakhstan to Kharg Island, Iran 900,000 bpd 1,300 miles Tengiz-Persian Gulf Estimated at $1.6 billion to $2.0 billion by the Kazakhstan Pipeline Co. (France). Status Proposed Significance Ambitious pIim would provide the Caspian littoral states with direct access to the Indian ücean. While cheaper than Baku-Ceyhan, this option will not leave the drawing board until the United States lifts sanctions. It also faces opposition from Russia and Turkey. Iran is not wed to this plan and it hopes to achieve similar results with its oil swap programme.
Route
Kazakhstan-Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Gwadar, Pakistan. Capacity 1,000,000 bpd Length 1,056 miles Cost $3 billion Status
In negotiation Significance
While initially heralded as a shortcut to Asian markets, continued conflict in Afghanistan has aLLbut ended interest in this project.
